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Abstract:	 Myanmar's	 recently	 opened	 economy	 is	 flush	 with	 incoming	 investment	 and	 activity.	 World	
leaders	advocate	that	all	businesses	entering	the	country	must	operate	in	a	"socially	responsible	manner."	
However,	the	history	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	in	Myanmar	is	undefined,	contradictory,	and	
complex.	 Thus,	 to	 get	 a	 handle	 around	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 “responsible,”	 this	 paper	 investigates	 the	
collective	way	in	which	actors	in	the	petroleum	industry	in	Myanmar	enact	CSR	from	1990	to	2014.	The	oil	
and	 gas	 (O&G)	 industry	 is	 the	most	 lucrative,	 and	 arguably	 powerful,	 national	 sector.	 The	 practice	 and	
philosophy	 of	 CSR,	which	 originated	 in	 this	 industry,	 is	 now	proclaimed	 to	 be	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 this	
newly	charted	course	of	responsible	business	in	Myanmar.	Yet,	activists	and	critics	maintain	that	CSR	is	an	
insincere	PR	measure	of	profit	maximization	whereby	companies	can	conduct	business	as	normal.	I	argue	
that	 CSR	 in	 the	 Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 influenced	 by	 more	 complex	 factors	 than	 profit	
maximization	 or	 image	 management.	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 sculpted	 by	 (1)	 the	 geography	 of	 petroleum	
extraction,	(2)	corporate	philosophies	and	company	national	origins,	and	(3)	type	of	company	operations.	
The	petroleum	industry’s	CSR	activities	to	date,	in	terms	of	geographic	span	and	development	targets,	all	fit	







this	 topic	 also	 unveils	 an	 expanding	 social	 network	 of	 corporate-funded	 social	 initiatives,	 also	
known	 as	 Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 (CSR)	 programs.	 This	 sector	 does	 not	 span	 across	 the	
country	 in	 a	 geographically	 uniform	 manner.	 Rather,	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 companies	 invest,	
extract,	 and	 transport	oil	 and	gas	 in	 select	 channels	out	of	Myanmar,	predominantly	 for	 foreign	
consumption.	 Onshore	 production	 sites	 are	 scattered	 throughout	 both	 remote	 and	 populated	




the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 pipelines,	 are	 marred	 by	 allegations	 of	 forced	 relocations,	 forced	 labor,	
torture,	inadequate	compensations,	and	unregulated	environmental	exploitation.	 	
Yet,	 there	 is	 a	 converse	 side	 to	 this	bleak	picture,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 social	 programs	 initiated	by	
these	 very	 same	 corporations.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 global	 trend	 towards	 the	 deregulation	 of	 state	
control	 over	 corporate	 ventures	 and	 the	 commodification	 of	 development,	 there	 is	 a	 push	 for	
corporate	social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	programs	 in	Myanmar	 to	answer	 for	unequal	distribution	of	
wealth	 as	well	 as	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	 injustices	 generated	 by	 corporations.	Many	 of	 these	
corporations	initiate	development	programs,	such	as	clinics,	orphanages,	and	tree-plantings.	In	the	
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absence	 of	 a	 strong	 NGO	 presence	 and	 an	 expansive	 state	 welfare	 network	 in	 the	 recent	 past	
(before	2014),	this	research	demonstrates	corporations	profoundly	shaped	the	social	landscape	of	
Myanmar	in	their	select	geographic	milieus.	CSR	can	be	disparaged	on	a	global	scale	as	an	empty	
moral	 endeavor,	 yet	 given	 Myanmar’s	 history,	 such	 projects	 are	 significant.	 These	 corporate	
actions	 should	not	be	dismissed,	but	 instead	 scrutinized	 so	as	 to	better	understand	 the	ways	 in	
which	companies	hold	themselves	accountable	legally,	socially,	and	environmentally.	 	 	
After	 decades	 of	 military	 rule	 and	 Western	 sanctions,	 in	 2011	 Myanmar	 embarked	 on	
ambitious	political	and	economic	reforms	by	transitioning	to	a	democratic	government,	liberalizing	
resource	and	private	sectors,	and	stimulating	foreign	investment	(World	Bank,	2014).	Previous	to	
this,	 companies	operating	 in	 country	were	publicly	 and	 frequently	 accused	of	 facilitating	human	
rights	 violations.	 After	 2011,	 international	 investment	 with	 the	 Union	 of	 Myanmar	 was	
enthusiastically	 encouraged.	 Leaders	 such	 as	 former	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Hillary	 Clinton	 declared,	
“Today	we	 say	 to	American	business:	 invest	 in	Burma	and	do	 it	 responsibly.”	Nobel	Peace	Prize	
Laureate,	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi,	 reversed	her	words,	and	now	acknowledges	that	Total	and	Chevron	
are	“responsible	 investors”	 (Nebehay).	The	CSR	programs	along	 the	Yadana	pipeline,	enacted	by	
Total,	 in	particular	are	now	cited	a	template	for	emulation.	 In	years	past,	these	same	companies	
were	vilified	for	engaging	the	very	same	investments	in	country,	by	the	same	actors.	 	
Myanmar’s	 government	 reciprocates	 by	 welcoming	 investors,	 but	 on	 the	 condition	 that	
companies	 conduct	 business	 in	 a	 socially	 and	 environmentally	 responsible	 manner	 (Lall,	 2012).	
Thus,	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	(CSR)	is	regarded	as	the	“key”	to	market	entry	in	Myanmar.	It	
is	the	“magic	words	on	everyone’s	lips,”	(Lall,	2012).	 	







But	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 be	 responsible?	 Where	 exactly	 does	 this	 “broad	 sense”	 of	 the	
responsibly	occur,	and	how	is	it	created	and	sustained?	Which	players	in	an	industry	participate	in	




of	our	 time	 is:	 “how	to	 identify	a	unit	of	 responsibility,	 in	a	 fiendishly	 complex,	multiply-layered	
and	decidedly	trans-national	apparatus	of	harm-production?”	(Ferguson,	2012).	 	
CSR	is	complex	because	it	does	not	have	a	concrete	definition,	and	is	further	complicated	by	
the	 intricate	economic	structure	of	companies,	contractors,	 subcontractors,	 shareholders,	etc.	 in	
any	 given	 economic	 project.	 Generally,	 CSR	 emerged	 as	 a	 self-regulating	 response	 by	 a	
corporation,	in	order	to	take	responsibility	for	its	impacts	on	societies	and	ecosystems	(e.g.	HSSE	







(O&G)	 industry	 is	 the	most	 lucrative,	 and	arguably	powerful,	 sector	 in	 the	 country.	 The	practice	
and	philosophy	of	CSR,	which	originated	in	this	industry,	is	proclaimed	to	be	the	starting	point	for	
this	newly	charted	course	of	 responsible	business	 in	Myanmar.	Yet,	activists	and	critics	maintain	
that	 CSR	 is	 an	 insincere	 PR	 measure	 of	 profit	 maximization	 whereby	 a	 company	 can	 conduct	
business	as	normal.	 	




CSR	 in	 the	Myanmar	 oil	 and	 gas	 industry	 can	 provide	 an	 initial	 insight	 to	 the	 above	 questions	
regarding	the	meaning,	geography,	methods,	and	players	of	“responsibility.”	 I	 further	argue	that	
CSR	 in	 the	 Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 influenced	 by	 more	 complex	 factors	 than	 profit	
maximization	 or	 image	 management.	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 sculpted	 by	 (1)	 the	 geography	 of	
petroleum	 extraction,	 (2)	 corporate	 philosophies	 and	 company	 national	 origins,	 and	 (3)	 type	 of	
company	 operations.	 Details	 of	 CSR	 initiatives	 are	 shaped	 by	 individual	 corporate	 logics.	 The	
boundaries	around	these	corporate	spheres	of	responsibility	have	been	orchestrated	by	a	range	of	
actors,	institutions,	and	forces.	This	has	resulted	in	an	expansive	network	of	responsibility	in	terms	
of	 geographic	 coverage	 and	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 development	 targets.	 In	 short,	 CSR	 and	 the	
understanding	of	“responsibility”’	is	complex.	Theses	nuances	cannot	be	wholly	brushed	off	as	an	
empty-hearted	PR	measure.	 	
To	 support	 my	 arguments,	 I	 first	 provide	 some	 theoretical	 context	 for	 CSR	 and	 the	 social	
context	of	Myanmar’s	 industry.	 I	 then	provide	some	context	to	the	political	nature	of	petroleum	
and	 then	 to	 extreme	 operations.	 After	 this,	 I	 introduce	 the	 situation	 that	 is	 the	 nexus	 of	 CSR,	
Myanmar,	 and	Oil	&	Gas.	 Following	 this,	 I	 summarize	my	methods.	Next,	 I	 present	my	 research	
findings.	In	this	section	I	describe	the	three	primary	factors	that	shape	CSR	programs,	followed	by	
individualized	corporate	reasons.	First,	 I	 investigate	the	geographic	span	of	CSR	to	 illustrate	how	
the	 geography	 of	 an	 operation	 affects	 where	 CSR	 programs	 are	 created.	 I	 provide	 details	 and	
justifications	 for	 programs	 initiated	 by	 offshore	 and	 onshore	 operators.	 The	 boundaries	 around	
CSR	programs	are	also	constrained	by	company	budgets.	Next,	I	show	how	the	national	origins	and	
philosophy	 of	 a	 company	 can	 affect	 CSR	 implementation.	 And	 lastly,	 I	 explore	 the	 uneven	
obligations	of	CSR	imposed	upon	different	types	of	companies.	Generally,	upstream	operators	are	
expected	 to	 enact	 CSR,	 while	 the	 contractors,	 which	 are	 integral	 to	 any	 operation,	 are	 not	
expected	to	engage	in	CSR.	Although	there	are	specific	instances	which	defy	these	generalizations,	
this	paper	provides	an	insight	into	overall	logic	of	CSR	in	the	industry.	
	 Dissecting	 where	 and	 how	 companies	 enact	 CSR	 gives	 insight	 to	 the	 emerging	 shape	 of	
responsibility	 in	 this	 sector	 and	 country.	 Given	 the	 impact	 corporations	 have	 on	 our	 earth	 and	
society,	this	is	deserved	of	close	attention.	This,	in	turn,	provides	a	window	into	the	ways	in	which	




Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	 is	 a	 business	 initiative	where	 corporations	 strive	 to	mitigate	
environmental	and	social	 impacts	(Occupational	Health	and	Safety	standards,	etc.),	to	abide	by	a	
set	 of	 regulations	 and	 standards	 (using	 the	 Equator	 Principles	 or	 IFC	 standards),	 as	 well	 as	 to	
improve	the	public	sphere	(in	the	form	of	community	programs).	In	the	absence	of	a	global	 legal	
entity	to	hold	corporations	accountable	for	environmental	negligence,	humanitarian	abuses,	and	a	




forms	 of	 governance	 associated	 with	 neoliberal	 globalization”	 (Barkan,	 2013).	 It	 has	 been,	 and	
continues	 to	 be,	 cast	 off	 as	 both	 “disingenuous”	 and	 “ineffective”	 in	 global	 and	 local	 contexts	
(Haalboom,	 2012).	 All	 of	 these	 claims	 are	 broad	 postulations	 that	 ignore	 specific	 corporate	
activities	and	geographic	contexts	which	should	deserve	closer	attention.	 	
CSR	has	been	“undergoing	a	definitional	evolution”	since	the	1940s	and	has	crystallized	into	a	
form	 of	 self-regulated,	 voluntary	 investment	 standards	 in	 reaction	 to	 increased	 public	 concern	
about	successive	deregulations	in	the	1990s	(Shamir,	2010).	It	aims	to	placate	the	legal	and	moral	
problems	that	companies	encounter	when	investing	in	states	without	strict	regulations.	CSR	can	go	
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beyond	 internal	compliance:	 it	has	evolved	as	a	venue	for	redistributing	corporate	wealth	 in	 the	
form	of	welfare	(‘CSR	programs’).	 	
In	 spite	 of	 its	 imprecise	 definition,	 CSR	 is	 now	 promoted	 by	 societies,	 governments,	 and	
corporations.	Organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank,	United	Nations,	and	Organization	of	Economic	
Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD)	have	endorsed,	promoted,	and	systemized	CSR	programs	
(Lee,	 2008).	Most	 Fortune	500	 firms	now	actively	 promote	CSR	 in	 their	 annual	 reports,	 and	 the	
Conference	Board	reported	that	90%	of	corporate	managers	state	that	their	companies	take	CSR	
“very	 seriously”	 (Lee,	 2008).	 The	 CSR	 initiative	 has	 become	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 businesses,	 both	
from	an	economic	and	social	standpoint.	However,	the	financial	benefits	for	the	company	and	its	
shareholders	remain	inconclusive	and	it	still	is	not	clearly	defined	(Lee,	2008).	 	









• Second,	 CSR	 can	 aim	 to	 redistribute	 the	 generated	 wealth	 in	 the	 form	 of	 corporate	
philanthropy.	 This	 is	 the	external	 community	 form	of	 CSR	which	 is	manifested	 in	 community	
initiatives	and	social	programs.	These	programs	are	not	part	of	the	company’s	core	extractive	
operations	and,	at	 times,	can	appear	 to	be	 irrelevant	 to	a	company’s	philosophy.	Confusingly	
enough,	sometimes	these	community	initiatives	can	be	any	combination	of	social	programs	in	
areas	of	company	operations	and/or	social	programs	with	no	geographic	or	company	link.	
The	external	 community	aspect	of	CSR	 incurs	divergent	positions.	Some	maintain	 it	 is	not	a	
company’s	responsibility	to	drive	social	change	(as	this	is	an	impingement	on	the	state’s	duty),	and	
the	 company	 should	 instead	 focus	 on	 paying	 taxes,	 abiding	 by	 environmental	 standards,	 and	
instituting	 community	 grievance	 mechanisms	 only.	 Some	 claim	 that	 because	 ‘failed	 states’	 are	
unable	 to	 sufficiently	 collect	 taxes	 in	 order	 to	 institute	 welfare	 programs,	 companies	 have	 an	
obligation	(and	responsibility)	to	fill	the	void	and	enact	community	projects.	 	 	
Most	studies	to	date	overemphasize	the	business	side	of	CSR	rather	than	provide	evidence	of	
social	 changes.	 Corporations	 are	 indispensable	 members	 of	 our	 society;	 both	 society	 and	
corporations	 are	 have	 profound	 behavioral	 influences	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 her	 study	 of	 the	mining	
company	Anglo	America,	Rajak	claims	that	anthropologists	study	CSR	by	looking	at	the	“intended	





is	 difficult	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 a	 company’s	 tax	 record,	 application	 of	 environmental	 standards,	
guarantee	of	 labour	protection,	and	other	 internal	CSR	components,	 this	account	focuses	on	the	




investment	 as	 an	 effort	 to	 encourage	 respect	 for	 human	 rights.	 The	 impact	 of	 these	 sanctions,	
although	 severe,	 was	 tempered	 by	 reinforced	 investment	 by	 Asian	 companies	 -	 especially	 in	
extractive	sectors	 (O&G	and	mining	 in	particular).	Corporations	 that	 remained	 in	Myanmar	have	
been	 accused	 of	 serious	 malpractices	 including	 reckless	 ecological	 destruction,	 the	 blatant	




There	 is	 a	 centralized	 component	 to	 the	 energy	 sector.	 To	 invest,	 every	 foreign	 and	 local	
company	must	 sign	 contracts1	 with	 the	 state-run	Myanmar	Oil	 and	Gas	 Enterprise	 (MOGE)	 and	
afterwards	may	explore	and	extract	petroleum.	Myanmar	is	emerging	as	a	key	producer	of	natural	
gas,	with	more	than	60	global	O&G	companies	participating	in	exploration	(Oxford	Business	Group,	






as	dead	 last).	 	 However	 in	2014,	Myanmar	moved	up	eighteen	 slots	 to	 share	 the	156th	position	
with	 Cambodia	 out	 of	 175	 ranked	 countries	 (Transparency	 International,	 2014).	 Compared	with	
other	 Southeast	 Asian	 neighbors,	Myanmar	 lagged	 far	 behind	 in	 terms	 of	 companies’	 ability	 to	
secure	electricity,	permits,	 licenses,	and	 the	average	 times	 to	set	up	businesses	 (Temphairojana,	
2013).	 	
Although	accurate	statistics	are	difficult	at	best	to	come	by,	Myanmar	has	consistently	ranked	
at	 the	 bottom	 of	 most	 socio-economic	 indicators.	 In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 revenue	 statistics	
generated	from	the	petroleum	industry,	Myanmar	is	one	of	the	poorest	countries	in	East	Asia	and	
the	Pacific.	 The	estimated	GDP	per	 capita	 for	2012/2013	 is	$868.	Thirty-two	percent	of	 children	
under	 the	 age	 of	 five	 suffer	 from	malnutrition,	 and	 access	 to	 drinking	water	 is	 limited	 in	many	




Myanmar’s	 GDP	 expanded	 8.7%	 in	 2014	 from	 the	 previous	 year;	 this	 trend	 is	 expected	 to	
continue	 (Global	 Finance,	 2015).	 The	 O&G	 sector	 has	 been	 the	 single	 largest	 source	 of	 foreign	
exchange	in	Myanmar	for	decades.	Foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	in	the	O&G	sector	amounted	to	




Petroleum	 extraction	 is	 a	 highly	 controversial	 industry.	 Companies	 have	 engaged	 in	
unscrupulous	 business	 practices	 resulting	 in	 severe	 social	 and	 environmental	 costs.	 High	 profile	
disasters,	from	oil	spills	to	human	rights	abuses,	fuel	public	outcry	and	enact	harsh	criticism	from	
the	 media,	 NGOs,	 and	 government.	 Such	 initiatives	 have	 resulted	 in	 significant	 and	 positive	









2	 As	 a	 recent	 Mizzima	 article	 details,	 the	 government	 has	 promised	 access	 to	 electricity	 for	 50%	 of	 the	
population	 by	 2020.	 Historically,	 most	 electricity	 has	 been	 siphoned	 to	 the	 major	 cities	 rather	 than	
distributed	across	rural	regions	(Mizzima	News).	
3	 Terms	 such	 as	 ‘Big	 Oil’	 and	 ‘Oil	 majors’	 are	 used	 to	 group	 the	 world’s	 largest	 publically	 owned	 oil	
corporations;	Total	and	Chevron	are	amongst	the	six	largest,	and	are	also	known	as	‘supermajors.’	
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The	 geologic	 and	 geographic	 properties	 of	 petroleum	 make	 it	 a	 deeply	 political	 resource	
(Mitchell,	2013).	The	fossil	fuel	network	with	its	corridors	and	venues	of	investment	are	marked	by	
a	 concentration	 of	 wealth	 and	 power.	 Petroleum	 is	 not	 distributed	 evenly	 around	 the	 world	
because	the	necessary	geologic	conditions	are	not	uniform.	Extraction	and	processing	requires	a	
much	smaller	work	force	(as	compared	to	our	previous	major	global	fuel	source,	coal).	Further,	the	




poverty.	 Significant	 portions	 of	 resource	 rich	 countries	 are	 subject	 to	 poverty,	 harsh	 conditions,	
and	blatant	 inequality.	Strategic	resources,	such	as	oil,	attract	foreign	investors;	yet,	the	physical	
properties	of	oil	combined	with	the	preexisting	social	and	political	structures	do	not	distribute	the	
generated	 wealth	 in	 an	 equal	 manner.	With	 increasing	 demand	 for	 petroleum	 the	 ‘frontier’	 of	
extraction	has	shifted	to	the	extreme.	This	shift	occurs	both	in	a	physical	sense,	such	as	Arctic	and	
ultra-deep	water	exploration,	and	 in	a	social	sense,	such	as	 investing	 in	states	with	controversial	
governance	systems	like	the	D.R.	Congo	and	Equatorial	Guinea.	The	social	nature	of	this	political	
resource	is	augmented	in	such	unconventional	contexts	(Bridge	&	Le	Billon,	2013).	Myanmar	can	
be	 considered	 an	 extreme	 context	 as	 it	 is	 the	 world’s	 newest	 frontier	 for	 investment,	 it	 is	





Oil	 Watch,	 2012)	 (Doe	 v.	 Unocal	 Case	 History,	 2012)	 (Mitchell,	 2013).	 Extraction	 can	 occur	 in	
“extreme	contexts”	 such	as	unstable	and	militarized	governments	 (Dellinger,	2009)	or	 in	 socially	
violent	environments	(Peluso	&	Watts,	2001).	 	
Commonly,	these	regions	have	little	regulatory	oversight	over	private	investments,	and	they	




There	 are	 methods	 to	 hold	 companies	 accountable	 in	 unregulated	 legal	 contexts,	 and	
Myanmar	boasts	a	pivotal	 legal	example.	In	the	1990’s,	pressure	from	EarthRights	International’s	





Operating	 and	 investing	 in	 such	 compromising	 situations	 is	 highly	 controversial.	 CSR,	 in	 the	
form	 of	 corporate	 voluntary	 self-governance	 and	 corporate	 funded	 welfare	 programs,	 aims	 to	
remedy	 these	 criticisms.	 Accordingly,	 investments	 in	 “extreme	 contexts”	 or	 “failed	 states”	 in	
particular	 demonstrate	 a	 clear	 need	 for	 (1)	 corporate	 self-regulation	 and	 (2)	 a	 form	 of	 wealth	
distribution	 for	 social	 programs.	 Given	 the	 vague	 or	 absence	 of	 government	 oversight	 and	





for	 foreign	 citizens	 to	 seek	 justice	 in	 U.S.	 courts	 for	 human	 rights	 violations	 committed	 outside	 the	
boundaries	of	the	U.S.		
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extraction	 in	 such	 contexts,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 cases	 from	 Rio	 Tinto 5 	 in	 Bougainville,	 PNG	
(Gilberthorpe	&	Banks,	2012)	to	Newmont	in	Indonesia	(Welker,	2014).	
While	CSR	is	strongly	encouraged	in	Myanmar	for	all	incoming	companies,	there	is	no	official	
definition	of	CSR	 from	the	central	government.	The	Myanmar	 Investment	Commission	 (MIC)	has	
no	specific	guidelines,	and	 there	 is	no	 legal	 structure	 to	enact	CSR6.	Companies	 interpret	CSR	as	
anything	from	charitable	donations	to	robust	health	and	safety	(HSE)	procedures.	 	
Such	 indirection	 is	 not	 uncommon.	 Globally,	 there	 is	 no	 sovereign	 body	 to	 govern	 the	





of	 CSR!”	 thus	 indicating	 the	 panoply	 of	 “responsible”	 corporate	 actions,	 understandings,	 and	
enactments.	 	
2.5.	CSR	in	Myanmar’s	Oil	&	Gas	Industry:	‘the	Wild	West	of	CSR’	
Myanmar’s	 first	CSR	programs	were	 initiated	 in	 the	1990’s	by	Total,	 a	 French	multinational	
petroleum	 corporation	which	 operates	 the	 Yadana	 Project.	While	 these	 flagship	 programs	were	
created,	 Total	 and	 Unocal	 (now	 Chevron)	 were	 brought	 to	 court	 in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 US,	
respectively,	 for	 facilitating	 the	 violent	 practices	 of	 the	 Myanmar	 army	 while	 constructing	 the	
pipelines.	These	socio-economic	projects	now	support	50,000	people	across	25	villages.	 	





like.	A	number	of	CSR	programs	appear	 to	be	philanthropic	acts	with	 little	business	 rationale	or	
geographic	relationship.	Many	projects	have	been	confused	with	aspects	of	Buddhist	merit-making	




regions	 far	 from	petroleum	operations,	while	others	are	 in	close	proximity	 to	offshore	pipelines.	
Examples	 include	 scholarship	 opportunities,	 tree	 plantings,	 funding	 for	 festivals,	 and	 medical	
clinics.	Although	there	are	multiple	partners	and	contractors	 for	any	given	operation,	only	select	
companies	 partake	 in	 CSR.	Many	 programs	 are	 not	 detailed	 on	 company	websites,	 while	 other	
companies	overemphasize	some	of	their	CSR	activities,	according	to	research	analysts.	
Select	 companies	 have	 a	 particular	 focus	 for	 their	 development	 programs.	 For	 example,	
Parami	focuses	on	monastic	education;	General	Electric	works	on	legal	reform,	energy	access,	and	
maternal	 health;	 operators	 from	 Daewoo	 to	 Petronas	 will	 provide	 emergency	 relief	 and	 enact	
expansive	networks;	while	other	companies	argue	that	 it	 is	not	the	company’s	place	to	subsidize	
aid	programs.	Some	companies,	such	as	Total,	CNPC,	and	Petronas	have	initiated	programs	across	
the	 country	 in	 addition	 to	projects	 in	 their	 area	 of	 operations.	 There	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 an	
immediate	rationale	to	explain	the	geographic	diversity	and	variety	of	development	targets.	One																																																									
5	 Rio	Tinto	extracted	copper	and	gold	from	the	island	of	Bougainville,	PNG.	Extreme	social	tensions	arose	at	
the	 Panguan	 mine	 from	 environmental	 degradation,	 which	 culminated	 in	 militant	 riots,	 PNG	 troop	
deployment,	and	 later	a	civil	war	(the	 ‘Coconut	Revolution’).	There	 is	recent	talk	of	welcoming	the	copper	
mine	back	to	Panguan	on	the	condition	that	the	company	implements	a	thorough	CSR	initiative.	 	 	
6	 Companies	 in	 Myanmar	 will	 pursue	 a	 Social	 License	 to	 Operate	 (SLO),	 but	 may	 shy	 away	 from	 an	
internationally	accepted	CSR	program,	as	such	goes	beyond	its	legal	requirements	Invalid	source	specified..	
A	SLO	is	not	a	legally	binding	agreement,	but	it	can	be	built	upon	through	community	acceptance.	




Weaving	 together	 the	 “units	 of	 responsibility”	 as	 understood	 by	 the	 architects	 of	 the	
Myanmar	 petroleum	 industry	 provide	 unexpected	 results 7 .	 CSR	 aims	 to	 placate	 social	 and	
ecological	ills	generated	by	the	industry.	However,	in	the	absence	of	specific	laws	and	in	the	face	of	
conflicting	expectations	from	local	and	international	actors,	petroleum	corporations	have	assumed	
(1)	 distinct	 geographic	 spheres	 and	 (2)	 particular	 arenas	 of	 development	 to	 exhibit	 their	
responsibility.	At	first	glance,	the	network	of	CSR	cases	does	not	appear	to	have	a	systemized	logic.	 	
3.	Methodology	&	Fieldwork	Overview	 	






To	 conduct	 a	 sector	 wide	 survey,	 this	 analysis	 evaluates	 the	 CSR	 activity	 of	 19	 energy	
companies	 (15	 of	 which	 I	 interviewed).	 This	 includes:	 onshore	 operators	 and	 partners	 such	 as	
MOGE8,	MPRL9,	CJSC	Nobel	Oil10,	GoldPetrol11,	and	Parami	Energy	Group12;	offshore	operators	and	
partners	 such	 as	 Petronas13,	 Daewoo14,	 CNPC15,	 Chinnery	 Assets16,	 Total17,	 Chevron18,	 PTTEP19,	
CNOOC20	 and	 KT	 Energy21;	 and	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 such	 as	 Halliburton22,	 Weatherford23,																																																									7	 To	date,	there	have	only	been	a	few	published	accounts	of	CSR	in	association	with	Myanmar	petroleum	
industry	in	the	social	sciences.	Both	have	focused	on	Total’s	Yadana	Pipeline	(Black,	2009)	(Holliday,	2005).	
8	 A	state-owned	company,	MOGE	is	responsible	for	the	exploration,	development	and	gas	transit	as	well	as	
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Schlumberger24,	 Punj	 Lloyd25,	 and	 SMART	 Technical	 Services26.	 I	 include	 General	 Electric	 in	 my	
analysis	because	this	power	company	spearheads	CSR	initiatives.	 	
The	 petroleum	 industry	 is	 expansive	 and	 intricate;	 by	 no	means	 is	 one	 company	 the	main	
driver	of	 any	one	operation.	By	 asking	 corporations	where	 their	 responsibilities	 lie,	 I	 attempt	 to	
elucidate	the	rationales	behind	these	purveyors	of	CSR.	
I	 compared	 the	 corporate	 information	 with	 interviews	 and	 documents	 from	 related	
researchers,	monitoring	agencies,	and	 journalists.	 I	 interviewed	personnel	 from	the	World	Bank,	
Extractive	Industry	Transparency	Initiative27,	the	Asia	Development	Bank,	the	Centre	for	Business	
and	 Human	 Rights,	 the	 non-profit	 Spectrum28,	 Revenue	 Watch,	 the	 first	 American	 law	 firm	 in	
Myanmar	(HRH&M),	Global	Witness,	and	the	Myanmar	Center	for	Responsible	Business	(MCRB).	 	
I	 interviewed	 staff	 and/or	 program	 managers	 from	 several	 activist	 groups:	 EarthRights	
International	 (ERI),	 Arakan	 Oil	 Watch	 (AOW),	 and	 the	 Shwe	 Gas	 Movement	 (SGM).	 These	
interviews	provided	 some	 illuminating	accounts	of	petroleum	extraction	 that	are	not	 told	 in	 the	
CSR	 pamphlets	 or	 company	 websites.	 Furthermore,	 I	 conducted	 informal	 interviews	 with	 three	
professors	who	specialize	in	Myanmar	affairs.	 	 	
These	 interviews	 were	 necessary	 to	 better	 assess	 the	 contradictions	 and	 paradoxes	








(5)	 the	 limitations	 of	 CSR,	 how	 it	 could	 be	 improved,	 and	 how	 corporate	 accountability	 is	
shaping	up	in	Myanmar.	 	
I	 readily	volunteered	anonymity	 for	 those	who	participated	 in	my	research	project,	and	this	
played	a	pivotal	role	in	being	granted	access.	Many	participants	did	not	want	to	be	quoted	directly,	
although	a	few	were	happy	to	be	cited.	To	be	consistent,	I	do	not	identify	any	individuals	by	name	
for	 either	 direct	 quotes	 or	 general	 insights.	 Instead	 I	 describe	my	 sources	 as	 “a	 CSR	manager,”	
“project	manager	 of	 an	NGO,”	 “oilfield	 service	 director,”	 and	 the	 like.	 	 Instead	 of	 using	 quotes	




there	 are	 three	 primary	 factors	 that	 drive	 how,	 what	 kind	 of,	 and	 where	 CSR	 programs	 are	
implemented.	First,	the	geographic	 location	of	company	operations	determines	where	many	CSR	
programs	 are	 initiated.	 Offshore	 operators,	 onshore	 operators,	 and	 contractors	 have	 select	
geographic	spheres	of	operations	and	thus	rationalized	corresponding	zones	of	CSR.	Second,	 the	
national	origins	and	individual	corporate	philosophies	can	determine	the	type	of	CSR	activity.	And	
third,	 the	 type	 of	 company	 operation	 (such	 as	 the	 operator	 vs.	 the	 contractor	 for	 an	 offshore	
pipeline)	has	a	clear	impact	on	CSR	initiatives.	 	 	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 three	 main	 factors,	 specific	 enactments	 of	 CSR	 are	 supported	 by	 an	
assortment	of	corporate	logics.	Some	companies	adhere	to	a	specific	corporate	philosophy	that	is																																																									




27	 EITI	 is	 a	 global	 coalition	 of	 governments,	 companies,	 and	 civil	 society	 working	 together	 to	 improve	
openness	and	accountable	management	of	revenues	from	natural	resources	(EITI,	2014).	
28	 a	nonprofit	dedicated	to	the	Sustainable	Development	Knowledge	network	
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reflected	 in	their	campaigns	around	the	world.	Others	have	a	“business	case”	for	CSR,	some	CSR	




Although	 petroleum	 is	 a	 national	 resource	 owned	 by	 states,	 as	 the	 resource	 is	 literally	
embedded	 in	 a	 state’s	 territory,	 there	 is	 a	 complex	 diversity	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 industry.	
Petroleum	is	understood	to	be	part	of	the	‘body’	of	the	state,	thus	evoking	charged	policy	decisions	
(Bridge	&	Le	Billon,	2013).	Yet	 it	 is	companies,	not	states,	which	explore,	transport,	and	produce	
petroleum.	 There	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 state	 owned	 (national)	 oil	 companies	 (NOCs)	 and	
international	oil	companies	 (IOCs).	Companies	are	 further	divided	 into	upstream	(exploration	for	
petroleum),	midstream	(transportation	of	the	oil	and	gas),	and	downstream	(the	refining	process).	
Contractors	 and	 sub-contractors	 provide	 drilling	 services,	 technical	 support,	 catering,	 security	
details,	 etc.,	 so	 that	 operations	 are	 even	 possible.	 As	 this	 resource	 is	 only	 found	 in	 certain	
environments,	it	requires	extensive	infrastructure	to	be	extracted	out	from	the	‘body’	of	the	state.	
This	 involves	 coordination	 from	 operators,	 partners,	 contractors,	 and	 sub-contractors.	 Oilfield	
service	companies,	such	as	Halliburton	and	Schlumberger,	are	essential	as	they	are	contracted	out	
for	 all	 projects.	 Even	 though	 there	 are	 dozens	 of	 corporations	 involved	 in	 any	 one	 project,	my	
research	indicates	that	most	CSR	initiatives	are	shouldered	by	the	upstream	operating	companies.	 	
4.1.1.	Offshore	Operators	 	
All	 offshore	 operators	must	 create	 CSR	 programs	 in	 geographic	 proximity	 to	 their	 zones	 of	
operations,	per	agreements	in	their	public	sharing	contract	(PSC)	with	MOGE.	Given	that	offshore	
extraction	occurs	miles	at	sea	with	no	communities	to	speak	of,	project	operators	must	perform	
CSR	 on	 land.	 This	 has	 come	 to	 mean	 that	 operators	 (such	 as	 Total,	 Daewoo,	 etc.29)	 create	
development	programs	in	the	vicinity	of	their	oil	terminal	and/or	pipeline	(Yadana,	Yetagun,	Shwe	
pipelines	 respectively).	 This	 expectation	 has	 encouraged	 CSR	 programs	 that	 are	 proximate	 to	
petroleum	operations.	 I	 regard	 this	as	a	direct	geographic	 rationale	 for	community	programs,	as	
the	 recipients	 are	 those	 that	 would	 most	 likely	 bear	 any	 externalities	 from	 these	 operations.	
Although	 these	 companies	 have	 enacted	 welfare	 programs	 in	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	 of	 their	
respective	 oil	 terminals	 and	 pipelines,	 there	 are	 no	 clear	 definitions	 of	 exactly	how	 far	 out	and	





and	 social	 impacts,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	 violations	 arising	 from	 the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 pipeline	









youths	 in	 the	 Tanintharyi	 region.	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 secure	 an	 interview	 with	 Chevron,	 and	 there	 is	 no	
information	about	this	program	online.	However,	I	include	Chevron’s	community	program	within	the	analysis	
of	 offshore	 operators	 because	 Chevron	 inherited	 many	 of	 the	 community	 issues	 passed	 down	 from	 the	
Unocal	law	suit,	and	currently	owns	28.3%	of	the	Yadana	pipeline.	
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None	of	 the	 interviewed	companies,	 except	Daewoo,	provided	 specific	boundaries	 for	 their	
zone	of	responsibility.	In	fact,	Petronas	and	Total	explained	that	they	are	expanding	their	programs	
to	 include	other	 villages	 beyond	 the	 region	 immediately	 surrounding	 the	 pipeline	 (the	 pipelines	
have	 not	 been	 extended).	 They	 also	 fund	 programs	 across	 the	 country.	 For	 instance,	 Petronas	
created	several	education	funds	and	contributes	to	a	wildlife	reserve	outside	Yangon,	and	Total	has	




of	 these	 shared	CSR	efforts.	 From	my	 interviews,	 it	 became	apparent	 that	 the	other	 companies	
tend	to	piggyback	onto	Total’s	network	of	CSR	programs.	All	partners	(such	as	Nippon	JX,	Chevron,	
and	 MOGE)	 will	 contribute	 funding,	 but	 Total	 is	 the	 primary	 executor.	 Total’s	 and	 Petronas’	
programs	have	a	long	history	in	Myanmar,	since	the	early	1990’s,	and	were	recently	applauded	as	
the	model	of	CSR	by	none	other	than	Aung	San	Suu	Kyi.	Researchers	described	Total	and	Petronas’	
social	 work	 along	 the	 pipelines	 as	 “comprehensive.”	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 far	 out,	 in	 terms	 of	
communities	and	distance,	social	responsibility	extends,	as	there	are	several	conflicting	geographic	
delineations.	 	
Daewoo	 defines	 its	 geographic	 span	 of	 responsibility	 solely	 in	 the	 region	 immediately	
surrounding	the	terminal	on	Kyauk	Phyu	Island.	Given	that	Daewoo	is	the	current	operator	of	the	
entire	Shwe	Project,	with	a	51%	stake,30	 I	had	assumed	this	meant	Daewoo	is	responsible	for	the	
geographic	 length	of	 the	Shwe	project	 (from	Kyauk	Phyu	oil	 terminal	and	Sino-Myanmar	parallel	














CSR	 as	 more	 of	 a	 function	 of	 human	 resources	 (HR)	 and	 benefits	 for	 company	 employees	 in	
Yangon.	This	company,	similar	to	others	extracting	from	the	Myanmar	coast,	does	not	have	fully	





link	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 obligatory	 community	 programs,	 or	 rather	 a	 zone	 of	 responsibility.	
Community	 programs	 are	 created	 either	 along	 operational	 pipelines,	 or	 at	 the	 site	 of	 an	 oil	
terminal.	 Although	 the	 offshore	 rigs	 are	 far	 from	 the	 communities,	 the	 onshore	 pipelines	 run	





30	 Other	 partners	 in	 the	 Shwe	 project	 include	 India’s	 ONGC	Videsh	 (17%),	 India’s	 GAIL	 (8.5%),	 Korea	Gas	
(8.5%),	and	MOGE	(15%).	




An	 offshore	 CSR	manager	 acknowledged,	 “When	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 [responsibility],	 the	
onshore	pipeline	doesn’t	really	affect	the	community.	But	we	will	affect	some	fishermen	when	we	
work	offshore.”	She	went	on	to	explain	that	some	community	members	on	land	were	affected	by	
the	 pipeline,	 but	 this	 was	 not	 significant.	 Even	 those	 working	 for	 monitoring	 agencies	 have	
mentioned	the	positive	 impacts	of	select	offshore	CSR	programs.	Essentially,	after	the	pipeline	 is	
constructed	 there	no	 longer	 is	 a	 strong	need	 to	 create	CSR	programs	 that	would	mitigate	 social	
tensions,	but	there	are	public	and	government	pressures	to	enact	 land	based	social	programs.	A	





Until	 2012,	 onshore	operators	were	discouraged	 by	 the	 government	 from	 creating	 external	 CSR	





	 Evidently	MOGE	 did	 not	 permit	 onshore	 operators	 to	 create	 social	 programs	 in	 the	 same	
areas	of	extraction	for	fear	of	community	riots	and	protests.	An	onshore	CSR	manager	explained	
the	logic:	since	communities	are	much	more	drastically	affected	by	onshore	operations	(there	is	an	
open	pit/well	 continuously	pumping	out	gas	or	oil	adjacent	 to	 rice	paddies	and	communities),	 it	
was	best	to	remain	entirely	disengaged.	If	there	was	engagement,	it	was	in	the	form	of	a	building	
construction,	 but	 not	 a	 sustained	 social	 program.	 This	 finding	was	 confirmed	 by	 CSR	managers,	
engineers,	and	company	directors.	However,	MOGE	is	now	open	to	active	community	engagement	
in	onshore	sites.	 	
Such	 a	 change	 in	 mindset	 takes	 time.	 As	 of	 2012,	 MPRL	 has	 made	 efforts	 to	 create	 CSR	
programs	in	the	Mann	field.	In	the	meantime	and	in	accordance	with	the	government	instructions,	
onshore	 operators	 have	 engaged	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 CSR	 initiatives	 that	 are	 distant	 from	
operations.	Parami31	 has	created	CSR	programs	in	Shan	and	Kayin	states.	These	projects	are	not	in	
proximity	to	its	operations,	which	are	west	of	Yangon.	 	 	 	
KT	 Energy,	 a	 Myanmar	 O&G	 company	 and	 joint	 operator	 with	 Russian	 company	 JSOC	
Bashneft,	 created	 the	 nonprofit	 foundation	 KT	 Care	 to	 manage	 all	 philanthropic	 activities.	 Its	
activities	 span	 the	country	and	 ranges	 from	emergency	 response	 to	capacity	building.	 It	 created	
programs	in	the	delta	region,	Rakhine	state,	as	well	as	around	Yangon.	Many	of	these	programs	are	
community	oriented	but	not	in	relation	to	the	communities	where	KT	Energy	operates.	The	KT	Care	




an	 interview	 with	 a	 current	 MOGE	 employee.	 One	 CSR	 manager	 remarked	 that	 MOGE	 would	
occasionally	build	a	school	or	pave	a	road	at	the	village’s	request.	 	 But,	as	she	emphasized,	this	is	
clearly	 nothing	 official	 or	 “well-planned.”	 Nobel	 Oil	 has	 no	 information	 online	 of	 any	 specific	
programs	in	Myanmar	and	does	not	create	CSR	programs,	although	it	does	engage	in	ad	hoc	type	











Parami,	 and	MPRL	 are	 the	 leaders	 in	 setting	 the	 precedents	 for	 increasing	 transparency	 and/or	
creating	social	programs.	This	evolution	is	tempered	by	MOGE’s	shortcomings	in	the	CSR	effort.	As	
the	overseer	of	all	petroleum	operations,	 the	default	 local	partner	of	 international	corporations,	
and	the	centralizing	authority	for	approving	CSR	programs,	MOGE	should	be	spearheading	CSR	by	
logic.	 	 Since	CSR,	as	a	business	concept,	is	still	in	its	initial	stages	in	Myanmar,	there	is	opportunity	
and	potential	for	MOGE	to	take	the	initiative	 	 	 and	for	onshore	operators	to	install	CSR	programs	
within	their	onshore	blocks,	in	addition	to	the	randomly	placed	philanthropies.	 	
4.1.3.	Extraction	without	Development	 	
A	 significant	 number	of	 companies	 in	 the	petroleum	 industry	 do	not	 enact	 community	 CSR	
programs,	 do	 not	 have	 information	 about	 CSR	 on	 their	 websites,	 do	 not	 have	 websites,	 have	
conflicting	 contact	 information,	 and	 seem	 to	 make	 no	 effort	 to	 jump	 onto	 the	 new	 CSR	
bandwagon.	Many	 of	 these	 companies	 include	 contractors	 and	 sub-contractors	 to	 an	 oil	 or	 gas	
project	 who	 have	 no	 CSR	 obligations.	 This	 is	 not,	 legally	 speaking,	 unfitting	 because	 only	 the	
operator	 must	 assume	 programs.	 However,	 contractors,	 sub-contractors,	 catering	 services,	
security	details,	etc.	are	the	fuel	of	the	petroleum	industry.	Leaving	these	constituents	out	of	the	
CSR	 picture	 greatly	 narrows	 the	 sphere	 of	 responsibility	 in	 this	 sector.	 This	 also	 highlights	 the	
uneven	obligations	of	CSR	imposed	on	companies	in	the	industry.	
Several	of	my	interviewees	informed	me	that	their	company	just	did	not	perform	CSR.	Many	




The	 industry	 transforms	 social	 and	 ecological	 landscapes;	 many	 companies	 are	 accused	 of	
malpractice.	Operations	create	roads,	pipelines,	wells,	and	bridges.	Onshore	extraction	consists	of	
open	 wells	 with	 vast	 tracts	 of	 jungle	 and	 agricultural	 lands	 removed.	 Offshore	 projects	 build	





a	 company’s	 philosophy,	 the	 pressure	 from	 internationally	 acclaimed	 politicians	 and	 company	
stakeholders,	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 an	 individual	 in	 the	 company,	 and	 the	 requests	 from	 local	
communities.	The	justification	of	a	“business	case”	for	CSR	can	be	but	one	of	many	components	in	
the	CSR	undertaking.	The	previous	section	examined	the	rationale	behind	the	geographic	location	
of	 CSR.	 This	 section	 explores	 the	 specifics	 of	 CSR	 programs	 and	 discusses	 the	 implications	 of	
company	national	origins.	 	
4.2.1.	A	Spectrum	of	Influences	
The	 principles	 of	 individuals	 within	 a	 company	 can	 be	 a	 profound	 shaper	 of	 community	
programs.	For	 instance,	Parami	 focuses	on	monastic	education,	a	 traditional	aspect	of	Myanmar	
social	 fabric,	 and	 environmental	 programs	 like	 tree	 plantings.	 Its	 CSR	manager	 emphasized	 the	
importance	of	collaborating	with	local	governments.	The	company	has	detailed	information	about	
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Parami	 aims	 to	 support	 one	 third	 of	 monastic	 education	 across	 the	 country.	 None	 of	 these	
programs	occurred	in	areas	of	active	operations.	
Sometimes,	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 one	 individual	 at	 a	 company	 are	 the	 key	 factor	 in	 CSR	




of	 Yangon,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 self-described	 acts	 of	 “token	 philanthropy.”	 Its	 CSR	 manager	
emphasized,	 “We	 want	 to	 help	 in	 any	 way	 we	 can”	 by	 gathering	 “true	 stories	 and	 true	
recommendations”	 to	 give	 out	 “assistance.”	 A	 member	 from	 their	 CSR	 team	 explained:	 “I	 get	






beneficial.	 Such	 programs	must	 fit	 into	 the	 company	 agenda,	 and	 are	 constrained	 by	 allocated	
budgets.	 MPRL	 self	 describes	 its	 CSR	 as	 “a	 culture	 we	 create”	 and	 is	 working	 towards	 an	
environment	 that	 adheres	 to	 international	 standards.	 In	 doing	 this,	 the	 company	 is	 trying	 to	
change	 the	 perception	 of	 CSR	 from	 “just	 philanthropy”	 to	 become	 “Transformative	 CSR.”	 As	
elaborated	 by	 MPRL	 staff,	 CSR	 and	 corporate	 activities	 are	 strategized	 and	 rationalized	 in	 the	
broader	 context	 of	 the	 company’s	 goals.32	 “Transformative	 CSR”	 is	 a	 way	 for	 a	 company	 to	
mitigate	 the	 impact	 of	 its	 activities,	 and	 to	 incorporate	 ethics	 and	 standards	 into	 everyday	
operations.33	 Yet,	such	a	turnaround	does	not	happen	in	a	short	time	span.	 	
Global	narratives	and	company	philosophies	are	another	significant	driver.	Companies	such	as	
Schlumberger	and	General	 Electric	 align	 their	 local	CSR	programs	with	 their	 global	development	




individuals	 to	 be	 successful	 professionals	 through	 its	 Human	 Capital	 Development	 programs.	
Further,	Schlumberger	regards	its	R&D	funding	as	its	greatest	contribution.34	 Increased	technology	
and	 innovation	 is	 much	 needed,	 given	 a	 global	 shift	 towards	 using	 unconventional	 petroleum	
sources.	 Additionally,	 Schlumberger	 engages	 in	 multi-scale	 projects	 in	 country:	 it	 coordinates	
university	 career	 talks,	 donated	 Wi-Fi	 infrastructure	 to	 Yangon	 Technological	 University,	























a	 broader,	 nationwide	 scale.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 locally	 placed	 programs	 that	 align	 with	 the	
company’s	 global	 campaigns,	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 accomplish	 CSR	 in	 another	 fashion.35	
Instead	of	a	community	program,	several	companies	expressed	that	an	important	responsibility	is	
to	 hire	 Myanmar	 nationals	 (80%	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Schlumberger,	 91%	 for	 Halliburton,	 100%	 for	
General	Electric).	They	all	emphasized	that	their	strongest	social	commitment	is	to	build	up	higher	
level	 education	 to	 lay	 a	 foundation	 for	more	Myanmar	 professionals.	 Accordingly,	 they	 provide	
professional	training	and	assistance	to	local	universities.	 	




locals	 for	 “odd	 jobs”	 to	providing	 short	 term	medical	 assistance.	 In	 several	 interviews,	 company	
staff	described	the	difficulty	in	wading	through	community	“needs”	and	“wants.”	 	
Further,	 corporate	 understandings	 of	 responsibility	 and	 community	 relationships	 can	 be	
shaped	by	local	NGO	groups	and	activists.	Total,	Petronas,	and	PTTEP	have	engaged	with	ERI	and	
local	communities	with	respect	to	programs	along	the	Yadana	pipeline.	Correspondingly,	Daewoo	




over	 profits	 and	 projects,	 MOGE	 does	 not	 engage	 in	 CSR	 other	 than	 to	 construct	 facilities	 per	
request	 of	 a	 community.	 MOGE	 is	 the	 centralizing	 and	 coordinating	 force	 for	 oil	 affiliated	




External	 forces	 such	 as	 internationally	 acclaimed	politicians	 and	 company	 stakeholders	 also	
influence	 corporate	 activity.	 Aung	 San	 Suu	 Kyi	 and	 Hillary	 Clinton’s	 plea	 for	 inclusive	 and	
responsible	 growth	 is	 a	 fundamental	 call	 for	 corporations	 to	 not	 only	 enact	 programs	 of	 social	
responsibility	but	also	to	structure	business	endeavors	in	a	sustainable	manner.	Until	very	recently,	
governments	and	corporations	collectively	divested	 in	Myanmar	 in	reaction	to	alleged	corporate	
malpractices.	 Total	 and	 Chevron	 were	 harshly	 criticized	 in	 their	 home	 nations.	 Public	 activism	
culminated	 in	 years	 of	 litigation.	 Yet,	 the	 corporate	 “shaming”	 continues.	 Epstein	 &	 Barclay	
examined	 the	 cognitive	 dissonance	 in	 inter-state	 “green	 shaming”	 and	 how	 such	 environmental	
shaming	can	be	used	as	a	foreign	policy	tactic	(Epstein	&	Barclay,	2013).	 	
	 In	addition	to	pressure	from	public	figures,	company	stakeholders	can	encourage	changes	in	
corporate	 activity.	 A	 recent	 copy	 of	 Chevron’s	 2014	 Proxy	 Statement	 (available	 online)	 includes	
multiple	 stakeholder	 requests	 for	 Chevron	 to	 properly	 address	 environmental	 impact	 and	
humanitarian	violence	in	association	with	the	company’s	conduct.	Proxy	statements	are	required	
company	 statements	 when	 soliciting	 shareholder	 votes.	 The	 stakeholders	 described	 Chevron’s	
current	 country	 selection	as	 “opaque”	and	 commented	 that	Chevron	does	business	 in	 countries	
with	“controversial	human	rights	 records”	 (Chevron,	2014).	Although	the	directors	 responded	to	




36	 However,	 Nobel	 Oil,	 does	 not	 create	 extensive	 community	 CSR	 programs,	 partly	 because	 there	 is	 no	
community	to	speak	of	in	the	jungle.	
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recommends	that	you	vote	AGAINST	this	proposal,”	the	Proxy	Statement	is	nevertheless	significant	
as	 it	 voices	 concerns	 that	 had	 been	 entirely	 absent	 from	 Chevron’s	 public	 relationship	 with	
Myanmar.	
In	her	study	of	mining	in	Indonesia,	Welker	 learned	that	Western	companies,	as	opposed	to	
their	Asian	 counterparts,	were	more	often	 targeted	by	NGOs	 and	 activists	 for	 corporate	 reform	
and	CSR	creation	(Welker,	2014).	This	insight	holds	true	in	the	case	of	EarthRights’	activism	against	
Total	 and	 Chevron.	 ERI	 staff	 remarked	 that	 they	 specifically	 targeted	 Total	 and	 Unocal	 (now	







fact	 that	 there	 are	 dozens	 of	 companies	 involved	 in	 any	 one	 operation.	 Contractors	 and	
subcontractors	 (e.g.	 oilfield	 service	 companies)	 are	 not	 expected	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 initiative.	
Second,	 although	 operators	 of	 onshore	 and	 offshore	 projects	maintain	 that	 partners	 contribute	








some	 oilfield	 service	 companies	 such	 as	 Smart	 and	 Schlumberger	 actively	 engage	 in	 CSR.	 Their	
community	 programs	 are	 found	 in	 random	 villages	 or	 are	 embedded	 HR	 strategies	 within	 a	
respective	company.	 	
Although	many	operators	emphasized	they	received	funding	from	their	partners	to	enact	CSR,	
the	 responsibility	 to	 organize,	 coordinate	 and	 sustain	 CSR	 programs	 falls	 upon	 the	 operator.	
Managers	 and	 other	 corporate	 staff,	 stressing	 the	 importance	 of	 development	 initiatives,	
mentioned	their	companies	would	donate	ad	hoc	to	select	programs.	Sometimes	this	meant	they	
donated	 to	 a	 partner’s	 program,	 while	 other	 times	 this	 meant	 that	 they	 would	 donate	 to	
unaffiliated	companies	with	which	they	do	not	conduct	business,	but	they	found	the	CSR	initiative	
impressive.	 Although	 this	 sounds	 like	 an	 excellent	 proposal,	 my	 interview	 with	 Global	 Witness	







criticism.	 Organizations	 such	 as	 EarthRights	 and	 Arakan	 Oil	 Watch	 have	 launched	 detailed	
investigations	 to	 the	 Yadana	 and	 Shwe	 Projects,	 respectively.	 However,	 there	 are	 no	 detailed	
accounts	of	the	less	well	known	onshore	and	offshore	operators	or	contractors.	 	
Smaller	 and	 less	 well	 known	 “cowboy	 companies,”	 escape	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 media,	 as	
described	 by	 the	 director	 of	 a	 major	 oilfield	 service	 company.	 This	 director	 criticized	 the	 vast	
number	 of	 such	 “cowboy	 companies”	 whose	 disregard	 of	 operational	 standards	 has	 usually	
remained	 out	 of	 the	 international	 limelight.	 In	 particular,	 he	 cited	 the	 smaller	 Indian,	 Russian,	
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cases	 launched	against	Total	and	Chevron	by	EarthRights,	as	well	as	 from	the	 list	of	publications	















and	 contractors,	 engage	 with	 communities	 (at	 some	 scale)	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 welfare	 and	
philanthropy.	During	 the	course	of	my	 fieldwork,	 I	was	never	given	a	precise	definition	 for	what	
does	and	does	not	constitute	the	surrounding	 ‘communities,’	or	how	far	 (in	terms	of	geographic	
distance)	 their	 zone	 of	 responsibility	 extends.	 For	 the	most	 part,	 many	 programs	 appear	 to	 be	
randomly	 selected	and	administrated.	The	vicinity	of	 responsibility	appears	 to	be	entirely	up	 for	
interpretation	 to	 individual	 operators.	 Most	 participants	 answered	 in	 vague	 language,	 and	
indicated	that	the	geographic	span	of	assumed	obligation	is	subject	to	change	over	the	years	and	is	
dependent	on	the	company’s	leadership.	
The	 internal	 logic	and	global	 forces	of	corporate	entities	 further	determine	how	CSR	can	be	
shaped.	Taking	 into	consideration	all	of	the	specific	company	rationales,	 it	becomes	evident	that	
Western	 and	 Burmese	 corporations	 tend	 to	 be	more	 engaged	 in	 the	 CSR	 effort.	 Pressure	 from	
respective	 national	 countries	 can	 encourage	 a	 greater	 adherence	 to	 regulatory	 standards	 and	
encourages	a	more	active	 role	 in	external	CSR	programs.	The	court	cases	 launched	against	Total	
and	 Chevron,	 in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 U.S.	 respectively,	 catapulted	 their	 corporate	 activities	 to	 the	
public	and	encouraged	a	working	relationship	with	NGOs	and	local	communities.	Newcomers	such	
as	 General	 Electric	 and	 old-timers	 such	 as	 Schlumberger	 align	 programs	 in	Myanmar	with	 their	
global	 initiatives.	Although	disparate	 in	CSR	 implementation,	Burmese	companies	such	as	MPRL,	
Smart	Technical,	and	Parami	organize	CSR	efforts	 in	 individualized	manners	 in	accordance	with	a	
set	of	local	and	personal	values.	In	addition	to	external	forces,	the	individual	corporate	philosophy	
shapes	the	particular	direction	of	social	programs.	 	
Asian	 companies,	 with	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	 Petronas,	 have	 created	 less	 extensive	
programs	 to	 date.	 Both	Asian	 and	 Eurasian	 companies	 usually	 respond	 to	 particular	 community	
requests	and	regard	CSR	as	philanthropic	constructions	instead	of	embedded	corporate	strategies.	
Further,	 there	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 system	 to	 publicize	 these	 actions.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	
entirely	unsurprising.	An	analyst	from	the	Business	and	Human	Rights	Centre	mentioned	that	Asian	
corporations	do	not	have	a	history	of	publicizing	their	corporate	activities	and	do	not	see	the	need	
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to	respond	to	media	requests.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	companies	do	not	create	programs	or	




A	 company’s	 operational	 scope	 further	 complicates	 the	 CSR	 issue.	 In	 short,	 oilfield	 service	
companies	(drilling,	security,	catering,	etc.)	are	all	vital	to	petroleum	projects.	Yet,	they	are	rarely	
mentioned	 as	 responsible	 agents.	 Nor	 are	 they	 the	 usual	 targets	 of	 NGOs.	 Less	 well	 known	
corporations	can	escape	the	attention	of	 the	media,	and	they	do	not	appear	 to	be	pressured	by	
stakeholders,	 nor	 are	 they	 on	 the	 public	 forefront.	 There	 are	 concerns	 with	 methods	 of	 CSR	
funding	 by	 project	 partners,	 and	 there	 is	 an	 uneven	 level	 of	 scrutiny	 by	 the	media	 and	 activist	





philanthropy.	 Accordingly	 in	 an	 ideal	 world,	 true	 corporate	 accountability	 would	 include	 full	
economic	 disclosure,	 such	 as	 revenue	 transparency	 and	 public	 information	 about	 beneficial	
ownership,	complete	disclosure	of	environmental	and	social	impacts	in	the	form	of	published	EIAs	
and	SIAs37,	and	would	integrate	operation	standards	of	“doing	no	harm.”	This	would	include	a	strict	
legal	 component;	 however,	 this	 is	 ambitious	 in	 all	 country	 settings,	 even	 countries	 with	 strict	
standards.	It	would	further	include	robust	HR	measures	of	equal	and	fair	pay	and	compensation	for	
company	workers.	 	
There	 is	also	a	 temporal	aspect	 to	 this	category.	According	to	the	directors	of	 two	different	
nonprofits,	none	of	the	recently	operational	companies	have	enough	of	a	track	record	to	warrant	
any	 praise.	 Although	 time	 will	 tell,	 companies	 including	 General	 Electric	 and	 BG	 Group38	 were	
mentioned	in	numerous	interviews	as	hopeful	candidates	for	such	type	of	responsible	investment.	
At	 the	moment,	most	 CSR	 praise	 is	 reserved	 for	 Total	 and	 Petronas’	 programs,	 possibly	 in	 part	
because	they	have	been	involved	with	communities	for	over	20	years.	 	
One	researcher	 I	 interviewed	believed	that	companies	needed	to	take	 into	account	national	
problems	rather	than	focus	on	select	community	grievances.	He	disregarded	the	corporate	outline	
from	 Business	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Resource	 Centre	 as	 the	 way	 to	 move	 onwards.	 Instead,	 he	
maintained	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 “deep	 and	 thorough”	 understanding	 of	 legal	 accountability	 and	
Myanmar’s	 contradicting	 laws.	 The	 lack	 of	 regulation	 implementations	 and	 challenges	 from	 the	
“leftover	dictatorship	bureaucracy”	must	be	addressed	by	corporations,	in	addition	to	addressing	
issues	 of	 “compensations	 and	 systematic	 corruption.”	 State	 taxes	 should	 be	 paid	 (and	 closely	
monitored)	 so	 that	 the	government	may	build	up	and	 support	 its	own	communities.	Addressing	
labour	rights,	including	fair,	equal,	and	timely	pay,	is	also	a	key	component.	He	concluded	there	is	
“promise”	 of	 such	 a	 system	 from	 those	 recently	 awarded	 blocks,	 but	 others	 have	 a	 more	
cautionary	approach	to	these	corporate	entities	given	that	the	gas	reserves	are	still	unknown.	All	of	
these	 sentiments	 were	 echoed	 in	 my	 interviews	 with	 personnel	 from	 the	 World	 Bank,	 Global	
Witness,	 and	 Revenue	 Transparency.	 Two	 researchers	 maintained	 that,	 given	 the	 landscape	 of	
problems,	 companies	 have	 a	 responsibility	 not	 to	 invest	 until	 systematic	 issues	 (such	 as	 land	
ownership,	tax	allocations)	are	properly	addressed	by	the	state.	Relatedly,	the	question	posed	by	
Holliday,	“can	profits	and	principles	be	secured	 in	 tandem?”	 in	The	Yadana	Syndrome,	obviously	
does	not	have	a	clear	answer	(Holliday,	2005).	 	
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can	 be	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 to	 verify	 the	 proclamations	 of	 CSR.	 Boycotting	 a	 select	 oil	
company	 for	moral	 reasons,	 he	 elaborated,	 does	 not	work	 in	 the	 same	 fashion	 as	 boycotting	 a	
particular	clothing	or	electronics	brand.	This	is	for	two	reasons.	First,	our	great	dependency	on	oil	
and	gas	as	an	energy	 source	and	a	building	block	 for	a	 range	of	needs	 (medical	 supplies,	 soaps,	
battery	cases,	fertilizers,	synthetic	rubber…)	hampers	any	comprehensive	rejection	of	a	particular	
corporation.	 Secondly,	 oil	 and	 gas	 products	 are	 pooled	 by	 corporations.	 Thus,	 boycotting	 one	
company	 does	 not	 necessarily	 affect	 the	 targeted	 corporation.	 He	 reasoned	 this	 is	 why	 the	
underlying	structures	of	oil	extraction	and	transport	have	not	been	changed	despite	the	activism	
against	petroleum	extraction,	production,	and	 transportation.	 In	 the	meantime,	companies	have	
embarked	on	“extreme	PR	adventures…	and	then	CSR.”	 	
The	 director	 of	 an	 environmental	 NGO	 emphasized	 the	 need	 for	 a	 “serious	 conversation”	
about	CSR	 instead	of	 a	 “shouting	match	between	ultra-moral	 eco	warriors	 against	 super	 evil	 oil	
managers,	with	those	of	a	less	absolutist	stance	silenced	in	between.”	Activists	such	as	Arakan	Oil	





corporate	 obligations	 continue	 to	 remain	 elusive.	 Ultimately,	 the	 geography	 of	 operations,	 the	
national	 origin	 of	 a	 company,	 and	 the	 type	 of	 company	 operations	 can	 be	 significant	 factors	 in	
shaping	 a	 corporation’s	 understanding	 of	 ‘responsibility’	 in	Myanmar.	 Such	 assumed	 spheres	 of	




with	 the	 encouragement	 and	 discouragement	 from	 the	 Myanmar	 government.	 Regarding	
development	 goals,	 company	 rationales	 for	 CSR	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 and	
forces.	These	range	from	pressure	of	activist	organizations	and	international	actors,	the	Myanmar	
government,	 to	 the	 personal	 ethics	 of	 a	 company	 individual.	 This	 generalization	 can	 begin	 to	
answer	 the	 questions	 about	 what	 is	 means	 to	 be	 responsible,	 and	 how	 is	 this	 created	 and	
sustained?	In	short,	this	understanding	of	responsibility	is	layered	with	complexity.	 	
The	companies	I	interviewed	unanimously	expressed	their	“obligation”	to	“give	back”	and	to	
“do	 the	 right	 thing.”	 	 However,	 deciding	where	 and	 how	 to	 “give	 back”	 is	 a	multi-dimensional	




Although	 this	 research	 examines	 the	 geographic	 span	 and	 materialization	 of	 CSR	 in	 the	
petroleum	 sector,	 these	 findings	 can	 be	 applied	 beyond	Myanmar	 and	 oil-funded	 development	
projects.	 CSR	 is	 far	 more	 complex	 than	mere	 acts	 of	 corporate	 charity,	 or	 PR.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	
contemporary	 solution	 to	 global	 corporate	 malpractice	 when	 extracting	 terrestrial	 and	 marine	




development	 project	 or	 an	 environmental	 standard.	 CSR	 fits	 into	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 the	
consequences	 arising	 from	 rapid	 globalization,	 the	 commodification	 of	 development,	 the	
performance	 of	 corporate	 morality,	 and	 the	 financial	 investments	 in	 what	 are	 referred	 to	 as	
‘extreme	contexts’	and	‘failed	states.’	
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